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Abstract
The Australian Labor Party (ALP) formed government under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in
2007 promising to consult with the not-for-profit sector on the development of a national compact.
It was the government’s aim to forge a new settlement with the sector after eleven years of
Liberal/National Coalition government during which contractual governance rather than relational
governance was the norm. The provenance of the National Compact, launched in March 2010,
can be traced back to similar framework documents for inter-sectoral cooperation in the United
Kingdom (principally, The Compact) and Canada (the Accord). The National Compact) cannot be
explained solely in terms of policy diffusion or the predilection of centre-right political parties for
policy instruments of this sort. Rather, explanation requires a more nuanced contextual analysis of
the political and policy environment within which these frameworks emerged. In this article we
compare the range of factors contributing to the development of The Compact (UK), the Accord)
(Canada) and the National Compact (Australia). We apply a similar analysis to policy frameworks
in selected Australian states. We conclude that compacts arrive on the policy agenda via the
opening of policy windows and through the actions of policy entrepreneurs. Policy windows and the
attention of policy entrepreneurs might be both contextual and therefore, time-limited. We consider
the range of factors that appear to have a bearing on the impact and durability of inter-sectoral
policy frameworks in each jurisdiction in order to draw tentative conclusions about the prospects
for the Australian National Compact.
KEYWORDS: Australia, compacts, relational governance, not-for-profit sector, comparative
policy
Author Notes: The authors wish to thank the editors and the three anonymous reviewers for their
considered comments and suggestions which have helped to make this a much better paper than it
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Something old, something new, 
Something borrowed, something blue, 
And a silver sixpence in her shoe. 
— traditional wedding rhyme 
 
The traditional rhyme above will be familiar to readers from the English-speaking 
world. It sets out the criteria for auspicious inclusions in a bride’s trousseau. It is 
also a suggestive metaphor for a union of another kind – that of the state and the 
not-for-profit sector (NFPS)1 via the medium of framework agreements for inter-
sectoral cooperation, often referred to as ‘compacts’. One such framework, the 
Australian National Compact launched in March 2010, brings ‘something old’ to 
the national policy scene, modelled as it is on the earlier English and Canadian 
compacts (respectively The Compact and the Accord) – two benchmark policy 
instruments that have influenced almost all subsequent approaches to 
government-NFPS rapprochement. Whether the Australian compact also offers 
‘something new’ in terms of an innovative re-working of the partnering 
framework remains to be seen. Like any ‘marriage’, it is a work in progress.2  
In this paper we compare the political and historical factors that have 
shaped the Australian government’s approach to a compact with those that 
influenced policy-making by central governments in the United Kingdom and 
Canada. The nature of Australia’s federation means that the NFPS has a far larger 
policy and financial interface with state governments than with central 
government. Despite this, there have been few comparative analyses of 
framework agreements for cooperation at the subnational level within the same 
country (Elson 2011:137). For these reasons we also examine the history of policy 
instruments for inter-sectoral cooperation in three Australian states – New South 
Wales, Western Australia and Queensland.  
These cases illustrate the importance of political and institutional context 
in the shaping of policy responses, even where these might be traced to a common 
origin (i.e. the English compact). The frameworks in each of these jurisdictions 
have evolved quite separately to the Australian compact and offer salutary lessons 
for other jurisdictions contemplating similar arrangements. Moreover, we 
conclude with some observations about the extent to which ‘compacts’ are 
                                                 
1
 In this paper we use the term ‘not-for-profit sector’ o r ‘NFPS’ to reflect the prevailing policy 
parlance in Australia. Where alternative terminology has been used in relation to developments in 
other jurisdictions (e.g. ‘voluntary sector’ in Canada) we have retained the original nomenclature 
where it seemed to be contextually relevant. We trust this will not cause too much confusion.  
2
 The relevance of ‘something blue’ and a ‘sixpence’ we will leave to the imagination of the 
reader. 
1
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capable of resolving the tensions inherent in the relationship between the 
contracting state and the NFPS. 
 
Compacts as Relational Governance 
 
Since the late 1990s policy-makers in various jurisdictions have looked to the 
development of framework agreements for inter-sectoral cooperation – which we 
will hereafter refer to by the accepted shorthand term ‘compacts’. Carter and 
Speevak Sladowski contend that formal deliberate relationships between 
government and the not-for-profit sector (NFPS) have ‘become a policy tool of 
choice’, although they might be pursued ‘for different reasons and in different 
contexts’ (2008:7).   
In the UK, Canada and Australia, compacts have followed in the wake of 
neo-liberal approaches to governance.3 In part they offer an antidote to the 
‘hollowing out’ of the state (Rhodes 2007, Rhodes 2000, Di Francesco 2001).4 
They also seek to address the policy co-dependence that results from an 
increasing government reliance on service-providing not-for-profit organisations 
(NFPOs) and the corresponding reliance of service-providing NFPOs upon 
government contracts for their income. This they do by supplanting the 
adversarial approach so often associated with contractual governance with a 
‘cooperative capacity-building approach’ (Rawsthorne and Shaver 2008:152-53).  
Compacts fall under the broad umbrella of ‘relational governance’. In 
contrast to formal or contractual governance, relational governance emphasises 
social processes (such as trust) that ‘promote norms of flexibility, solidarity and 
information exchange’ (Zheng et al 2008:43). By their very nature compacts are 
(or ought to be) predicated on cooperation and collaboration – indeed they are 
sometimes referred to as ‘policy documents for cooperation’ (Bullain and 
Toftisova 2005). This suggests that they are also fundamentally voluntary in 
nature. Founded on good faith rather than compulsion, compacts generally do not 
                                                 
3
 Including privatisation, the marketisation of services and third party contracting (see Casey et al 
2010). The contrasting narrative in former Eastern Bloc countries centres on the re-establishment 
of civil society structures and norms following decades of autocratic rule, the abrupt dismantling 
of centrally planned and coordinated state services and the subsequent capitulation to a form of 
market capitalism often unconstrained by the formal checks and balances usually found in mature 
market economies  (See Bullain and Toftisova 2005). 
4
 The ‘hollowing out’ thesis advanced by Rhodes, Di Francesco and others describes a state that 
has moved beyond the logics of ‘command and control’ to a greater reliance on networks and 
‘diplomacy’ (Rhodes 2007). The hollowed-out state is characterised by external dependence and 
internal fragmentation that both weaken the central organising capacity of the state and challenges 
the executive’s ability to ‘steer’ (Rhodes 2000: 350, Di Francesco 2001: 106). Characteristic of the 
‘contracting state’, hollowing out raises normative questions about both the role of the state and 
the ability of the state to influence the direction and coherence of policy and outcomes (Di 
Francesco 2001: 104-106). 
2
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have a statutory basis and are not legally enforceable (Morison 2000). This 
absence of enforceability can be a source of tension in a relationship characterised 
by profound asymmetries of both formal authority and financial resources. 
The inherent ‘relationality’ of compacts is at once a source of strength and 
weakness. Although relational governance is credited by some with the potential 
to transform the relationship between state and non-state actors (Bourgon 2008; 
Shergold 2008) others caution against under-estimating the challenge of 
overcoming the path dependent legacies of new public management – or NMP 
(Lyons and Dalton 2011; O’Flynn 2009; O’Flynn 2008). In this regard it must be 
observed that compacts sometimes fail to live up to initial expectations and often 
engender scepticism – particularly amongst government’s NFPS ‘partners’ (Lyons 




It is broadly accepted that The Compact (UK 1998) set the standard and provided 
the template for subsequent inter-sectoral relationship agreements in countries 
such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Edgar 2008:19; Carter and Speevak 
Sladowski 2008:7; Casey et al 2008b:5).5  Indeed, it is possible to plot the 
adoption of compacts both transnationally (e.g. from the UK to Canada and then 
to Australia) and intranationally (e.g. between Australian state jurisdictions). It is 
tempting, therefore, to seek explanation in processes of policy diffusion. Policy 
diffusion is evident where the preferred policy responses (and the framing of 
social problems) in one polity have been systematically conditioned by prior 
problem definition and choices made in other polities (Simmons et al 2006; 787). 
For example, the spread of public administration ‘doctrines’, such as those 
encompassed by NMP, are often thought of in these terms (Common 1998; Hood 
1991).  
It is also tempting to explain the spread of formal policy frameworks for 
inter-sectoral co-operation as a function of the political complexion of governing 
parties in polities where they have been adopted (policy diffusion coupled with 
policy convergence). For example, we observe that most compacts have emerged 
in jurisdictions governed by centre-left political parties. This might reflect a 
tendency for the notional constituencies of centre-left parties to overlap with those 
                                                 
5
 There is abundant circumstantial and anecdotal evidence that the English Compact provided both 
the inspiration and a practical template for practically all subsequent agreements. Whilst the 
primacy of the Compact is generally acknowledged, it is also clear from the accounts officials and 
sector representatives in Australia, Canada and New Zealand that the exchange of knowledge, 
experience and ideas between jurisdictions has formed an important part of the development of 
deliberate relationship frameworks. 
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of social movement organisations.6 It might also reflect a recent tendency for 
centre-left parties to emphasise ‘cross-cutting’ and ‘joined-up’ approaches to 
governance.7 In contrast, conservative or centre-right political parties are often 
portrayed as more inclined to cleave to ‘neo-liberal’ or market-based approaches 
to governance. Although they might employ ‘partnership rhetorics’, relationships 
with the NFPS tend to be defined in instrumental and contractual (rather than 
collaborative) terms.8 
Where governing parties sit on the political spectrum might well provide a 
pathway for – or erect barriers to – the diffusion of particular framings of 
problems and preferred solutions.  However, political orientation alone does not 
explain how or why policy ideas take hold in a given polity, nor is it a predictor of 
success. Explaining the emergence of compacts requires consideration of the 
environment in which policy problems are framed and the roles played by 
institutions and policy actors in enabling (or impeding) their implementation. 
Although scholarly accounts of the political and operational tensions associated 
with the competitive tendering and contracting of human services paint a 
reasonably consistent picture, it is also clear that different jurisdictions have 
adopted quite different approaches to the management of these tensions. 
Understanding ‘why’ requires a contextual analysis of the extent to which policy 
learning and transfer is shaped by historical and institutional factors (Common 
2010:3-4). 
In his seminal book Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (first 
published in 1984), Kingdon posed the questions: ‘what makes an idea’s time 
come?’ and ‘what makes people in and around government attend, at any given 
time, to some subjects and not to others?’ (Kingdon 1995:1). Kingdon observed 
that in the volatile marketplace of ideas and solutions – which he referred to as the 
‘policy primeval soup’ – some ideas never gain traction, others become prominent 
and then fade, and some ‘achieve lasting high agenda status’ (Kingdon 1995:116). 
Kingdon suggested also that the ascendancy of policy initiatives sometimes 
                                                 
6
 Such as Blair’s ‘New Labor’ in the UK, or Chrétien’s Liberal Party in Canada, or the Australian 
Labor Party under Prime Ministers Rudd and Gillard. 
7
 In this context ‘joined-up’ policy refers to ‘cross-cutting’ or ‘horizontal’ approaches to 
governance – working across, and achieving more effective integration across institutional and 
domain boundaries. Joined-up policy requires collaboration and is predicated on ‘network’ or 
‘relational’ governance. In Australia, the term ‘whole-of-government’ is frequently used to 
connote approaches to governance intended to break down cultural and programmatic silos. 
8
 It is tempting to view compacts as a contemporary form of liberal corporatism in which the state 
grants ‘privileged and institutionalised access to policy formulation’ to organised interests 
(Heywood 2000: 164). Both centre-right and centre-left governments are ‘corporatist’ insofar as 
they privilege particular interests. Whereas centre-left governments have been inclined to privilege 
civil society sectors (e.g. trade unions, the community sector), centre-right governments might be 
more inclined to privilege business or industry sectors and individuals. These observations bear 
directly on the potential for existing compacts to be re-framed by in-coming governments. 
4
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depends on the opening of ‘policy windows’ and on the actions of ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ who exploit these time-limited opportunities to ‘couple’ preferred 
solutions with existing policy problems (Kingdon 1995:166-69; 181-82).9  
Kingdon’s thesis offers a useful lens for a contextual analysis of compacts 
and other forms of inter-sectoral agreement. In the next section we will examine 
the national compacts in England, Canada and Australia along four broad 
dimensions: the political context in which policy windows emerged; the key 
policy drivers exploited by policy entrepreneurs to place a compact on the policy 
agenda; the primary impacts and outcomes attributable to the policy framework; 
and the likely future directions of the policy framework given the emergent 
political and institutional context within which it is evolving. 
 
Compacts in England, Canada and Australia 
 
Policy windows can open in times of political or policy change/uncertainty, such 
as an election, a change of leadership or other events that either necessitate or 
permit new policy approaches. So it was that Blair’s articulation of a ‘Third Way’ 
as a counter to the market fundamentalism of Thatcher and Major created a 
receptive environment for the English compact (Kendall 2000, 2003); Chrétien’s 
embrace of the Accord in Canada provided a political ‘wedge’ against a weakened 
conservative right and restored his party’s progressive credentials after major cuts 
to government programs in his first term (Phillips 2003a); and Rudd’s 
commitment to a National Compact in Australia enabled a clear differentiation 
between his in-coming Labor government and that of his predecessor, John 
Howard. It each case policy actors – inside and outside government – exploited 
the opening of these policy windows in order to place a compact on the national 
agenda (see Table 1).10 
                                                 
9
 Kingdon and other like-minded theorists (such as March and Olsen) draw upon 
neoinstitutionalist theory in their analysis of political and policy phenomena, bringing together 
strands of normative (institutional logics), rational choice (bounded rationality) and historical 
(path dependency) perspectives in a compelling synthesis. Kendall (2003), Brock (2008) and 
Phillips (2003) each draw upon Kingdon in their analyses of compacts in the UK and Canada. 
Compacts might also be usefully examined through other lenses, including policy implementation 
(Elson 2006) or from a functional legal/administrative perspective (Bullain & Toftisova 2005). 
10
 It is not possible in a paper of this length to fully describe the events and decisions supporting 
this analysis. Kendall (2003, 2009,2010) provides a comprehensive account of the English 
Compact while Brock (2000, 2004, 2008) and Phillips (2002, 2003) offer cogent insights into the 
history of Canada’s Accord. As for Australia, there has been little to date in the way of published 
scholarly research in relation to the National Compact.  
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Table 1 — A Comparison of National Frameworks for Inter-sectoral Cooperation 
 
 The Compact (United 
Kingdom 1998/2009/2010) 























s Blair Labour government 
elected in 1998. 
‘Deakin Commission’ (1996) 
recommends a ‘concordat’ 
between the state and the third 
sector. 
New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ 
emphasis on ‘social exclusion’ 
and ‘horizontal’ policy 
frameworks. 
 
Chrétien Liberal government 
re-elected in 1997. 
‘Broadbent Panel’ (1999) 
recommends compacts 
between government and the 
sector along the lines of those 
in the UK. 
Borrowed from the English 
Compact as a distraction from 
‘neo-liberal fiscal policies’ of 
previous term (Elson 2006). 
 
Rudd Labor government 
elected in 2007, Gillard 
minority government formed 
2010. 
Intention to develop a compact 
forms part of 2007 election 
platform. 
Rudd government tasks 
Productivity Commission to 
report on contribution of the 
sector (2010). Report sets out 
minimum requirements for the 


























Response to ‘Conservative 
preoccupation with the 
dichotomy of market & state’ 
(Kendall 2003) and to the 
excesses of the ‘contract state’. 
Prof Nicholas Deakin and Alun 
Michael (later Secretary of 
State for Wales in Blair 
Government) important in 
framing key policy concepts 
(Kendall 2003). 
Government adopts ‘joined-up’ 
government and social 
exclusion as key themes. 
Grew out of recognition that 
NFPOs were increasingly 
assuming functions once 
performed by governments 
(Phillips 2003; Brock 2004a, 
2004b). 
Broadbent Panel and key 
federal public servants 
champion a compact along 
lines of UK compacts. 
Attempt to repair ‘broken 
relationship’ between 
government and the not-for-
profit sector and signal a 
departure from the market 
fundamentalism of previous 
government. 
Senator Ursula Stephens 
champions compact in 
opposition – later appointed 
Parliamentary Secretary for 
Social Inclusion and the 
Voluntary Sector.  
Former Blair Labour 
government adviser and 
Director of DEMOS (UK), 
Tom Bentley, joins Gillard’s 
staff in 2007.  
Government adopts ‘joined-up’ 
government and social 
inclusion as key themes. 
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Table 1 — (continued) 
 
 The Compact (United 
Kingdom 1998/2009/2010) 
The Accord (Canada 2001) 




































Was ‘without precedent’ and 
spawned many offshoots 
(Kendall 2003). 
Model replicated in 
‘constituent countries’ of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland prior to devolution. 
Codes of Good Practice, local 
compacts.  
Office for Civil Society, 
Commission for the Compact 
and Compact Voice. 
Accord a centrepiece of 
Voluntary Sector Initiative 
(VSI), which ended in 2005. 
Codes of Good Practice, range 
of resource material to support 
capacity-building. 
Contributed to coalescence of 




report welcomed by the sector. 
Office for the Not-for-Profit 
Sector (ONFPS) and Not-for-
Profit Sector Reform Council 
established in late 2010 to 
oversee implementation of 
National Compact. 
ONFPS commences 
development of a code of 















Compact ‘refreshed’ in 2009 




Commission for the Compact 
abolished 2010. 
Cameron government’s ‘Big 
Society’ agenda promotes 
devolution and mutualisation 
of public services. 
Conservative Harper 
government elected in 2006. 
Accord itself has not ‘expired’, 
but considered a ‘dead letter’ 
by the sector. 
‘Policy lead’ for NFPS-
government relations resides 
with a federal line agency 
(Human Resources & Skills 
Development Canada). 
In its 2011 Budget the 
government announces the 
intention to establish a national 
regulator, the Australian 
Charities and Not for Profits 
Commission (ACNC) in 2012. 
Statutory definition of charity 
to be legislated. 
Council of Australian 




Opposition announces that if it 
wins the 2013 election, it will 
not proceed with the ACNC as 
currently proposed. 
 
The Compact (UK) 
 
The Compact (1998 and 2010) is an agreement between the UK central 
government and civil society organisations (CSOs) in England (the devolved 
authorities of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own operational 
responsibilities for CSOs).11 However, The Compact is not purely a sub-national 
policy framework: While it does not override existing arrangements for 
                                                 
11
 The Compact’s original title is Compact on relations between the government and the voluntary 
and community sector in England. In keeping with the Blair government’s policy of devolved self-
government, separate ‘national’ compacts were developed by the Scottish, Welsh and Northern 
Ireland Offices during 1998 and bequeathed to the Executive authorities of each of the ‘Home 
Countries’. The Compact was renewed in 2010 and is now subtitled: ‘The Coalition Government 
and civil society organisations working effectively in partnership for the benefit of communities 
and citizens in England’. 
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engagement between the devolved authorities and CSOs, ‘where the UK 
Government interacts with CSOs or has responsibility for funding services 
provided in Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales, it will honour the commitments 





The idea for a ‘concordat’ between central government and the NFPS first 
emerged in the mid-1990s as a recommendation from the Commission on the 
Future of the Voluntary Sector chaired by Nicholas Deakin (Deakin Commission 
1996). Although the proposal for a concordat was rejected by John Major’s 
Conservative government as being neither a ‘sensible or usefully achievable 
objective’, Kendall notes that Deakin’s report was to a large extent framed in the 
expectation of a likely Labour victory at the 1997 general election (Kendall 
2003:53).  
 
Key policy drivers 
 
The Deakin Commission was in fact only one of three major reviews of voluntary 
sector policy in the UK in the 1990s (the others being the 1993 CENTRIS report 
and the 1995 DEMOS report – see Kendall 2003:52). Nearly 20 years of 
Conservative administration under Thatcher and Major (1979-97) offered little in 
the way of sustained commitment to Britain’s voluntary sector and while tax 
treatment and legal frameworks were improved at the margins formal engagement 
with the sector tended to be disjointed, abrasive and adversarial (Kendall 
2003:54). By contrast, Blair’s ‘New Labour’ embraced the idea of a 
communitarian pact with the voluntary sector (Kendall 2003:55-56). 
The Compact was a natural vehicle for Blair’s ‘third way’ approach to 
governance with its emphasis on cross-sector and cross-jurisdictional coordination 
and served to mark a clear departure from the market-centred neo-liberal policy 
settings of previous Conservative governments and the statist traditions of old 
Labour (Kendall 2003:55; NCVO 2007b). By the time of Labour’s landslide 
election win in 1997, the foundations for a compact had already been laid (Lyons 
2001:5-6). Nicholas Deakin, a respected centre-left social policy academic, and 
senior Labour Party figure Alun Michael MP (who in opposition led the Labour 
party’s review of relations with the voluntary sector12) exchanged ideas in a 
                                                 
12
 In February 1997 the Labour Party published a report on the voluntary sector entitled Building 
the Future Together. Authored by Alun Michael the report called for an agreement between the 
voluntary sector and the government in terms very similar to those used in the Deakin Report. 
Significantly Deakin had already held several informal discussions with Michael, then an 
8
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process of ‘deliberate syncopation’ that led, ultimately to a convergence around 




Over the 13 years of Labour government the English compact acquired an almost 
iconic status.  Occasionally, however, it was found wanting. A Cross Cutting 
Review conducted in 2002 (HM Treasury in 2002) identified a number of 
systemic shortcomings with its implementation and a later House of Commons 
review noted potential conflicts with aspects of EU procurement law (House of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee 2008:52-54). Nevertheless, 
The Compact endured and adapted.  
In 2009 a flagging Brown Labour government ‘refreshed’ The Compact 
following ‘extensive debate and consultation’ (Insight 2010) citing the need to 
‘improve implementation of both the specific commitments ... as well as the broad 
principles on which they are based’ (Commission for the Compact 2009:8-9). 
Despite its shortcomings and occasional detractors, a study prepared in 2011 for 
the Commission for the Compact concluded that the English compact ‘has lasted 
longer than most policy initiatives’ and owes its longevity to an approach to 
partnership founded on the principles of horizontal cooperation (Commission for 




Despite having exhibited political and policy ambivalence towards the English 
compact for much of its time in opposition, under David Cameron’s leadership, it 
was embraced by the Conservative Party: a ‘u-turn from its position when in 
power’ (Kendall 2009:19, fn. 6). The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government, elected on May 2010, signalled its intention to review both the 
document itself and its associated accountability frameworks and, in December 
2010, a ‘renewed’ compact was announced. The Compact would be ‘backed by 
full Parliamentary accountability’ including ‘a one-off study’ into its operation 
across government conducted by the National Audit Office (HM Cabinet Office 
2010a). However, the Commission for the Compact, established in April 2007 by 
the Blair Government, would be abolished and the role of promoting The 
Compact would ‘be taken on jointly by the Cabinet Office and Compact Voice’ 
(HM Cabinet Office 2010a).  
                                                                                                                                     
important figure in the Labour Party (Michael was appointed Minister of State and Deputy Home 
Secretary following Labour’s 1997 election victory and later became First Secretary for Wales). 
9
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It is possible that in re-branding the English compact the Cameron 
government hopes to co-opt both the policy framework and the sector itself in the 
fulfilment of its broader Big Society agenda based on decentralisation, 
streamlining government, devolution to local government, encouraging social 
entrepreneurship, and promoting individual and community empowerment 
(Commission for the Compact 2011:15-16,130; Norman 2010). Support for such a 
conclusion can be found in a recent Green Paper canvassing reforms aimed at 
achieving a ‘power shift’ away from central government and modernising the 
commissioning of public services in order to ‘enable commissioners to drive and 
implement public spending cuts in fully informed ways, removing unnecessary 
duplications and responding to local priorities’ (HM Cabinet Office 2010b:6).  
A ‘summative report’ prepared for the Commission for the Compact on 
the eve of the Commission’s demise cautions that The Compact is at risk, citing: 
the thicket of newer and higher-profile initiatives that bypass it; the new 
text scrabbled together to reflect the Coalition’s emerging policy agenda; 
the “cull of the Quangos” that terminated its principal guardian, the 
Commission for the Compact; and government’s somewhat cavalier 
approach to the resourcing (and even existence) of the organisations 
required to deliver the Big Society agenda... (Commission for the 
Compact 2011:2) 
The report is pessimistic, on the whole, cautioning that the English 
compact will come under pressure in the immediate future as a result of cuts in 
public expenditure and consequent impacts on voluntary and community 
organisations and the people they serve (Commission for the Compact 2011:135). 
In the policy primeval soup of minority government, however, it is possible that 
the Conservative Party’s coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, might prove to 
be an important moderating force against the potential excesses of Cameron’s 
‘Big Society’ although their support for The Compact is equivocal at best (Liberal 
Democrats 2011:19). 13 
                                                 
13
 Prior to the election, the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for Communities and Local 
Government, Julia Goldsworthy, referred to the Big Society as ‘patronising nonsense’ (source: 
http://www.libdems.org.uk/news_detail.aspx?title=Cameron’s_Big_Society_is_patronising_nonse
nse_says_Goldsworthy__&pPK=cdc0887a-d7fc-4ac6-bda2-da4a04696ab9). See also Liberal 
Democrats Policy Consultation, ‘Voluntary Sector and Volunteering’, Consultation Paper 99, 
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The Accord (Canada) 
 
In June 2000, on the strength of joint developmental work by sector 
representatives and government officials, the Canadian government committed 
CA$94.6 million over five years to a Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI) of which 
an Accord would be a centrepiece (Phillips 2003a:32; Canada 2009). In the 
months that followed a working group reflecting a cross-section of federal 
government departments and the voluntary sector – the Joint Accord Table – 
collaborated in the drafting of the Accord document.  
The Accord14 was launched in December 2001 by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien 
who hailed it as ‘the blueprint for a strong and vibrant relationship between the 
voluntary sector and the Government of Canada’. Although Brock (2008:14) 
remarks that the Accord and its associated codes of practice ‘began as watered 
down versions of the British compacts’, Phillips (2003a:18) observes that the 





In Canada, tensions similar to those driving the development of the English 
compact marshalled the diverse elements of the country’s NFPS behind the 
concept of a framework agreement that would guide and shape government-NFPS 
relationships. The relationship between the Liberal government led by Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien and the NFPS had deteriorated significantly during its first 
term in office (1993-97). Chrétien’s government came to power at the height of a 
fiscal crisis to which it responded with a program of public sector austerity that 
severely tested the capacities of the NFPS (Miller 1999:75-76). Chrétien also 
commanded an unassailable majority in his government’s first term, the 
Progressive Conservatives having lost all but two seats in the House of Commons 
(out of 151 seats held prior to the election), and used that majority to slash federal 
government expenditure. 
Just as in the UK the Deakin Commission was an important catalyst for 
the idea of a concordat with government, in Canada the Panel on Accountability 
and Governance in the Voluntary Sector (Broadbent Panel 1999) fulfilled the 
same purpose. Chaired by a former federal leader of the socialist New Democratic 
Party, Ed Broadbent, the Panel was established by the Voluntary Sector 
Roundtable with funding provided by the J. W. McConnell Family Foundation. 
The Panel drew on recent experience in the UK and included among its 
recommendations the establishment of mechanisms ‘such as compacts … for 
promoting understanding and agreement on appropriate conduct and the future of 
                                                 
14
 Full title: Accord between the Government of Canada and the Voluntary Sector. 
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the relationships between the sector and governments’ (Broadbent Panel 1999:16-
17). 
 
Key policy drivers 
 
Having aggressively tackled the country’s $42 billion deficit in its first term, the 
Chrétien government was returned in the 1997 general election, albeit with a 
reduced majority. The government was now prepared to begin the task of re-
building its political capital and undertook to re-invest budget surpluses generated 
during its first term in a range of social programs, thus marking a return to its 
centre-left traditions of investment in social policy and programs (Phillips 
2003a:25). In such an environment the government was receptive to the idea of an 
Accord which would allow the government to affirm its support for the voluntary 
sector in a manner that was highly symbolic, did not require passage by 
Parliament, was relatively inexpensive and ‘virtually guaranteed to meet with 
public acceptance’ (Phillips 2003a:30-31).  
Canadian NFPOs – like their counterparts in Australia – have a larger 
direct interface with sub-national governments (the provinces and territories) than 
with the federal government. The sector had made earlier, largely unfulfilled, 
overtures towards cooperative policy frameworks at the provincial level. In the 
end it was to the federal sphere that the Canadian NFPS turned in the late 1990s to 
forge a new settlement with government, largely owing to the connection between 
NFPS capacity/sustainability and the federal taxation treatment of charitable 




The resources allocated to the VSI made possible a variety of research, policy 
development and regulatory reform activities. However, this work is only 
indirectly attributable to the Accord itself (Carter and Speevak Sladowski 
2008:34-35; Hall et al, 2005:24; Phillips 2003a:31). There is only anecdotal 
evidence that the Accord has resulted in genuine institutional change (Elson 
2006:45) and formal relationships established to give effect to the VSI have ‘not 
endured to any degree beyond the five years of the building period’ (Carter and 
Speevak Sladowski 2008:35). 
By 2005, the VSI had run its course: its funding was not renewed and 
broader changes to the machinery of government under the Martin (Liberal) and 
Harper (Conservative) governments saw the core secretariat functions relocated 
from the centre of government to a succession of line agencies, thereby 
compromising the capacity for horizontal policy and programmatic co-ordination 
(Lindquist 2008:157; Brock 2008:21; Elson 2007:56; Phillips 2003a:45). 
12
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Even so, the VSI helped to forge connections between actors in ‘most 
parts of the sector in most parts of the country’ and this is cited as one of its ‘most 
enduring legacies’ (Carter and Speevak Sladowski 2008:35). According to Brock, 
the VSI represented a ‘coming of age’ for the Canadian voluntary sector, which 
now has ‘a stronger and more unified voice ... and is a more formidable ally and 
antagonist to government’ (Brock 2008:21). An evaluation of the VSI published 
in 2009, describes the initiative as ‘unique’ in its scope, scale and the joint nature 
of the work (Canada 2009:iii). Indeed, Lindquist reminds us that the institutional 
reform agenda set by government and the sector was ambitious and that ‘much 
was accomplished’: 
A coherent view developed of what a well-functioning non-profit and 
voluntary sector was, including how a good relationship with government 




The Accord remains in effect, although it is widely regarded by the sector as a 
‘dead letter’.15 However, the same policy dynamics that put the sector ‘on the 
federal radar screen’ (Phillips 2003a:25) ultimately crowded out both the Accord 
and the VSI and resulted in their relegation further down the policy agenda 
(Lindquist 2008:163). Laforest notes that the ‘voluntary sector is not currently on 
the Conservative federal agenda’ (Laforest 2009:155) although she argues that the 
drift towards policy indifference had begun before the election of the 
Conservative Harper government in 2006 (recently re-elected with a 
parliamentary majority in May 2011). 
 
The National Compact (Australia) 
 
The National Compact was launched in March 2010 by Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd who used the occasion to proclaim the start of an era of ‘true collaboration’ 
(Rudd 2010). The National Compact sets out ‘shared principles’ that provide a 
broad agenda for cultural and behavioural change in the public and NFP sectors, 
and ‘shared aspirations’ – some of which take the form of specific commitments, 
such as the development of agreed ‘codes of engagement’ – and from which flow 
a set of eight ‘priorities for action’. 
The development of the Australian compact document was informed by a 
series of consultations with the sector throughout 2008 and 2009 initiated and 
                                                 
15
 Ostensibly, the Government of Canada ‘continues to maintain its commitment to the principles 
set out in the Accord “to strengthen the sector’s capacity and to improve the legal and regulatory 
framework governing the sector.” (correspondence from Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada dated 06/01/2010). 
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overseen by government and assisted by the Australian Council of Social Service 
– the national peak body representing the not-for-profit community services 
sector. These consultations revealed broad sector support for a compact, 
‘overwhelming interest’ in improving the relationship with government and a 





When Kevin Rudd’s Labor Party formed government in November 2007 the 
centre-right Liberal/National Coalition government of John Howard had been in 
power for 11 years. The Howard government’s relations with parts of the NFPS 
were strained due to the government’s social conservatism, an intolerance of 
advocacy (evidenced in ‘gagging provisions’ inserted into service delivery 
contracts) and its enthusiastic embrace of market-based approaches to service 
delivery (through the creation of quasi-markets and the application of competitive 
tendering and contracting) (Maddison et al 2004; Melville 2003). Although the 
Howard government extolled the virtues of ‘community-business partnerships’, it 
exhibited no inclinations towards a formal relational framework with the NFPS 
(Butcher 2006; Casey et al 2010; Casey and Dalton 2006).  
Four months after the launch of the National Compact the government’s 
public approval ratings were in free-fall. Rudd’s Deputy, Julia Gillard (who also 
held the social inclusion portfolio) successfully challenged for the leadership of 
the Labor Party. Twenty-three days later Prime Minister Gillard called a general 
election. The government’s re-election platform included express commitments to 
pursue the not-for-profit sector reform agenda.  
 
Key policy drivers 
 
In the lead-up to the 2007 general election the Labor opposition committed to a 
fundamentally new settlement with the NFPS within the framework of a broader 
social inclusion agenda and emphasising joined-up solutions. This included an 
express commitment to the development of a compact. Labor’s pre-election 
policy platform accused the Howard government of having ‘attacked both the 
right and the capacity of community sector organisations to advocate’ and 
undertook to rebuild trust and reciprocity as the ‘foundation of a new relationship 
between a Federal Labor Government and the community sector’ (Gillard and 
Wong 2007:9-11).  
With its emphases on social inclusion, ‘joined-up’ solutions and a new 
settlement with the NFPS, Labor’s policy platform echoed that of Blair’s New 
Labour a decade previously. The platform makes explicit reference to Blair’s own 
14
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reflections on his government and to the examples of the English compact and the 
Accord, which further underscores the provenance of the proposals.  The idea of a 
compact was actively promoted within Labor ranks by Senator (and later 
Parliamentary Secretary for Social Inclusion and the Voluntary Sector) Ursula 
Stephens.16 It is also interesting to note that both before and after the election, 
Labor benefited from the counsel of a number of senior figures from the UK 
Labour Party, such as former Blair government adviser, Tom Bentley, who later 





One of the first acts of the Rudd government in this policy space was to task the 
Productivity Commission – the government’s premier economic advisory body – 
to carry out a comprehensive study of the social and economic contribution of the 
not-for-profit sector. The inquiry was chaired by Robert Fitzgerald who, prior to 
his appointment as Commissioner, was an influential figure in the not-for-profit 
sector (he was formerly President of the Australian Council of Social Service and 
Chair of the National Roundtable of Nonprofit Organisations). The report 
produced by the inquiry set out 14 major recommendations (which were further 
sub-divided into a number of subsidiary recommendations). The Commonwealth 
(federal) government has accepted all recommendations for which it has 
jurisdictional responsibility. 
In October 2010 the government fulfilled an election commitment to 
establish an Office for the Not-for-Profit Sector in the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (initially for three years). This gave practical effect to a 
substantive recommendation in the Productivity Commission Report (Productivity 
Commission 2010: 378) and was welcomed by the sector as an affirmation of the 
government’s intentions. The Office’s role is to drive the reform agenda and to 
coordinate cross-portfolio input with particular emphasis on the implementation 
of the National Compact. The Office also provides secretariat support to the Not-
for-Profit Sector Reform Council (NFPSRC), an advisory body appointed in 
December 2010 with a membership drawn from across the NFPS.  
To date the Reform Council has convened five working groups to give in-
depth consideration to and provide advice on the following: 
                                                 
16
 Although, it should also be noted that the task of developing and implementing the National 
Compact had been delegated to the Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). The policy lead for the National Compact resided with the 
Department of FaHCSIA until October 2011 at which point responsibility transferred to the newly 
established Office for the Not-for-Profit Sector located in the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet. 
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• the scoping of a national regulator in the form of an Australian Charities 
and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC), including advice in relation to a 
general reporting framework and the development of draft legislation;17 
• red tape reduction, including the streamlining of reporting mechanisms, 
establishing a template for a common funding agreement, improved 
funding application processes and improved contracting and purchasing 
arrangements; 
• the harmonisation of legislation across Commonwealth, state and territory 
governments and the implementation of a Standard Chart of Accounts 
(SCOA); 
• advancing the priorities set out in the National Compact including through 
the ‘co-creation’ by the sector and the government of a ‘Consultation and 
Policy Development’ code of practice; and 
• the impact on not-for-profit organisations of tax arrangements announced 
in the 2011-12 Budget stipulating that not-for-profit entities will be 
required to pay income tax on profits from their unrelated commercial 




The August 2010 election resulted in a hung Parliament in which Gillard was able 
to form a minority government with the support of crossbench MPs. A number of 
‘hot-button’ policy issues were canvassed during the election, including climate 
change and border security as well as other contentious programs and policy 
failures – any one of which could easily have crowded NFPS reform off the 
policy agenda. It was probably fortunate for the future of the National Compact 
that the new Prime Minister had previously held the Social Inclusion portfolio 
and, as Deputy Prime Minister, had herself championed the compact.  
The hard work is yet to be done to give substantive effect to the National 
Compact and the reform agenda that flows from it. As the compact itself affirms, 
‘We will know that we have achieved the Compact’s purpose when we see real 
evidence of our shared aspirations in all our interactions’ (Commonwealth of 
                                                 
17
 The government announced in its 2011-12 Budget the intention to establish the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) to serve as a ‘one-stop-shop for the support 
and regulation of the NFPS’ with an independent Commissioner reporting to the Parliament via 
the Assistant Treasurer (Shorten and Plibersek 2011a). The purpose of the ACNC will be to 
‘streamline reporting requirements, reduce compliance costs and provide certainty to not-for-
profits about their rights and responsibilities’ (Shorten and Plibersek 2011b). It will commence 
operation by 1 July 2012 following a one-year establishment phase. This announcement gives 
practical effect to a recommendation from the Productivity Commission to establish a one-stop-
shop for Commonwealth regulation in the form of a national registrar (recommendation 6.5, 
Productivity Commission 2010:152-53). 
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Australia 2010b). However, as former head of the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, Peter Shergold, observed of the compact before its launch, 
‘[t]he problem is that such documents, full of fine sentiment and the rhetoric of 
partnership, quickly lose their ability to influence behaviour’ (Shergold 2010). 
The reality is that compacts represent a process that can easily unravel if 
commitment is only superficial (Craig et al 2005:10-12; Bullain and Toftisova 
2005:66).  
Despite the apparent good intentions of the government and the number of 
initiatives currently in train, a range of sector commentary suggests a degree of 
reservation and even cynicism about the prospects of the National Compact. This 
might be a reflection of broad community disaffection with the Labor government 
(whose recent opinion poll results have been the worst in recent memory) and a 
perception in parts of the sector of a growing gap between the government’s 
rhetoric and the reality at the coalface of service delivery. As Marsh et al observe, 
the Rudd government ‘used the discourse of network governance and increased 
participation in the policymaking process largely as means of legitimising or 
promoting decisions that had already been taken’ thereby masking ‘the continued 
role of hierarchy in a political system that essentially remains underpinned by a 
top-down conception of democracy’ (Marsh et al 2010:157).  
For the Gillard administration, wrestling with the uncertainties of minority 
government, signature policies such as the National Compact might still have 
political resonance, provided they can, as was recommended by the Productivity 
Commission, be given ‘concrete expression’ through ‘practical measures’ and 
‘documented plans of action’ (Productivity Commission 2010:378). Just how the 
opposition Liberal-National Coalition might re-frame the agenda should they win 
government remains to be seen. Apart from a commitment to establish a pilot 
scheme for a corps of student volunteers, the Coalition has been largely silent on 
NFPS specific measures in this policy space (Liberal Party 2010).  
The Shadow Minister for Families, Housing and Human Services, Kevin 
Andrews has committed a future Coalition government to simplifying the 
relationship between government and NFP service providers and cautions against 
‘unnecessary state control of the civil sector’ (Andrews 2011). Andrews also 
warns against risks to the vibrancy and independence of the sector if it becomes 
‘ensnared by contractual obligations, designed to fit governmental silos’ – the 
very criticisms levelled against the Howard government in which he was a 
minister (Andrews 2011).  
More recently, Andrews has signalled the Coalition’s intention to ‘reverse 
the nanny state’ and has derided the proposed Australian Charities and Not-for-
profits Commission as ‘monolithic’, and a ‘power grab by government’. The 
Coalition would instead establish ‘a small Commission as an educative and 
training body’, attached, initially, to the Australian Taxation Office.  The new 
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body would have no regulatory role. A future Coalition government would 
promote philanthropy, ‘restore a culture of personal responsibility’ and simplify 
reporting and contractual requirements. Government would support and empower 
the work of not-for-profit organisations, not direct them ‘as an arm of the State’ 
(Andrews 2012). 
Andrews has also suggested that the Howard government perhaps went 
too far in its past embrace of market-based approaches to social provision (ABC 
2012). This suggests a rejection of both the quasi-corporatism of Labor and the 
Howard government’s contractualism in favour of some kind of paternalistic 
residualism. Australian policy watchers, anticipating a Coalition victory at the 
next election in 2013, have speculated about the possibility that the opposition 
will model its approach to civil society on Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ agenda. 
Although Andrews has rejected comparisons between coalition policy and ‘Big 
Society’, it is plausible that many of Big Society’s core ideas could diffuse to 
Australia. 
 
Compacts in Unitary Versus Federal Systems 
 
Compacts in federal states, such as Australia and Canada, exhibit quite different 
intra-national dynamics to those observed in unitary states such as the United 
Kingdom or New Zealand.18 In federal systems such as Canada and Australia, the 
constitutional division of powers confers responsibility on provincial/state and 
territorial governments for funding, commissioning and delivering a wide range 
of public services. Central government has few levers with which to influence the 
relationship between sub-national governments and the NFPS.19  
There is no mechanism in either Canada or Australia that would allow a 
federal government to compulsorily require the adoption of a compact by other 
                                                 
18
 Owing to word limitations New Zealand was not included in this review. The Clark Labour 
government initiated discussions with the community and voluntary sector in 1999. In 2000, the 
government issued a unilateral Statement of Government Intent (SoGI) articulating broad 
principles for government-NFPS engagement. Following the defeat of the Labour government in 
the general election of November 2008, the conservative National Party government led by John 
Key committed to the development of a Relationship Agreement between the government and the 
‘Communities of Aotearoa New Zealand’. Significantly, the Minister leading this initiative, 
Tariana Turia, is also the Deputy Leader of the government’s minority partner Maori Party. 
Interestingly, Turia also held the Community and Voluntary Sector Portfolio as a Labour MP 
under Helen Clark. For more information see: http://www.ocvs.govt.nz/work-
programme/relationship-agreement/relat-agree-consultation.html  
19
 Both countries also exhibit a high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) in which the national 
government’s share of revenues is disproportionately larger than its share of direct outlays, and the 
sub-national governments’ share of revenues is disproportionately smaller than its share of 
outlays. This means that sub-national governments are highly dependent upon federal transfers for 
their social spending. 
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levels of government. The Canadian Accord had little influence on the financial 
relationship between NFPOs and sub-national governments and although four 
provinces have since entered into formal bilateral ‘collaboration agreements’ and 
two have made unilateral declarative policy statements concerning the 
relationship between the sector and government (Elson 2006:44 and 2012 this 
issue), these largely developed independently of the federal initiative and of one 
another (Carter and Speevak Sladowski 2008:9). 
In Australia, the National Compact will similarly directly affect only those 
NFPOs that have a financial relationship with the federal government. While there 
is no mechanism by which the Commonwealth government could bind states and 
territories to the National Compact, there is evidence of information exchange 
between state/territory officials and their federal counterparts concerning 
implementation of the broader reform agenda, particularly in relation to the 
harmonisation of regulation and reporting requirements (COAG 2010:14; 
Productivity Commission 2010:113). 
By contrast the central government in the UK has an extensive direct 
interface with the voluntary sector (Clark et al 2009).20 Although a significant 
share of voluntary sector income derives from local authorities, the UK’s system 
of delegated authority allows central government to directly influence local 
government expenditure for social services. Whereas subnational policy 
frameworks for inter-sectoral cooperation in Canada and Australia have 
developed independently of any national initiative, those in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland all have their origins in frameworks modelled after the English 
compact and bequeathed to the newly devolved administrations by Whitehall21 
(although these instruments have since been adapted by the Executive in each of 
the Home Countries). 
 
Australian States and Territories 
 
All Australian states and territories have explored the potential of formal 
relational frameworks between government and the community or voluntary 
sectors. With one exception22, these frameworks were initiated under centre-left 
Labor governments – most during the period in which the centre-right 
                                                 
20
 In the UK funding from statutory sources accounts for 36% of voluntary sector income of which 
43% derives from central government and 47% derives from local authorities. 
21
 The former Scottish and Welsh Offices and the Northern Ireland Office. 
22
 In April 2001, the Liberal government of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) published 
Compact: community partnership ACT Government: the first step – ‘the first Compact of its kind 
in Australia’, preceding even the Canadian Accord (Australian Capital Territory 2001:4). 
Following a change of government in 2001, the incoming Labor administration effectively re-
branded and re-issued the document as the Social Compact (2004) but without materially altering 
its contents. 
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Liberal/National Coalition governed nationally (1996-2007). However, recent 
changes of state/territory government have meant that frameworks for inter-
sectoral cooperation have been inherited by nominally conservative 
administrations, sometimes with interesting results. 
Three jurisdictions – the Australian Capital Territory (2004), New South 
Wales (2006) and Queensland (2008) – currently have bilateral compacts with the 
NFPS although these largely focus on the human services sector. These compacts 
draw their inspiration from the English compact and the Accord and exhibit a 
similar form and language. They articulate the respective roles and contributions 
of government and the third sector; enunciate shared values and principles of 
conduct; and set out reciprocal undertakings. Although presumptions of 
partnership, inter-sectoral collaboration and even co-production underpin the 
language of these agreements, practise, at times, diverges from the rhetoric. 
Other jurisdictions – South Australia (2003), Tasmania23 (2008), Victoria 
(2008) and Western Australia (2009) – have pursued more ‘unilateralist’ or hybrid 
approaches: initiated by governments and involving consultation with the sector 
(usually the health and social welfare sub-sectors24), but not necessarily premised 
upon a formal agreement or even consensus about objectives and strategies. On 
the whole, these initiatives proceed from the pragmatic presumption that in their 
role as commissioners rather than direct providers of services, governments are 
necessarily concerned to ensure the capacity, capability and viability of the NFPS 
as an important agent of service delivery. 
In the UK and Canada national policy frameworks preceded those 
developed by other levels of government. The causal observer might conclude 
that these later agreements cascaded from the national agreement either 
compulsorily or naturally via policy diffusion. While we have already cited clear 
evidence of the former with respect to the UK, we have also noted that policy 
frameworks for inter-sectoral cooperation in Canada owe little to the earlier 
national agreement. Australia’s experience presents an interesting contrast in that 
compacts have been part of the policy landscape for over a decade in the 
country’s states and territories.  
Although the Commonwealth government was certainly aware of this 
                                                 
23
 The Tasmanian government and the state’s NFPS have recently re-commenced a process that 
might lead to the formalisation of a bilateral ‘Partnership Agreement’. It is expected that a draft 
agreement could be available for public consultation by late November 2011. 
24
 In Australia, those parts of the third sector concerned with health and social welfare are 
generally referred to collectively as the ‘community sector’. It is interesting to note that Labor’s 
2007 pre-election policy statements employed the terms ‘third sector’ and ‘community sector’ 
interchangeably, which suggested that the proponents of Labor’s policy possibly didn’t understand 
the difference. 
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policy history25 there is little evidence that state/territory experiences have 
significantly shaped its approach to the National Compact. Even so, we consider 
that the performance of state/territory frameworks do offer salutary lessons for the 
federal government. Three states in particular provide useful illustrations of the 
continuum of policy frameworks for government-NFPS cooperation: New South 
Wales, Queensland and Western Australia (See Tables 2 and 3). 
 
Table 2 — A Comparison of Frameworks for Inter-sectoral Cooperation in Selected 
Australian States: Political Context & Key Drivers 
 














Working Together for NSW - 
An agreement between the 
NSW Government and NSW 
non-government human 
services organisations (2006) 
Queensland Compact – 
Towards a Fairer Queensland 
(2008) 
Delivering Community 
Services in Partnership Policy 
- A policy to achieve better 
outcomes for Western 
Australians through the 
funding and contracting of 

























Carr Labor government elected 




based competitive tendering 
and contracting (CTC). 
Carr resigns 2005. Leadership 
changes three times before 
Labor is defeated in 2011 
election. 
Bligh Labor government re-
elected 2009 after change of 
leadership in 2007 (Beattie 
Labor government formed in 
1998). Bligh commits to 
developing a Compact (2007). 
Bligh government defeated in 
2012 general election. 
Incoming Liberal National 
Party (LNP) government 
pursues major public sector 
cuts.  
Barnett Liberal minority 
government elected 2008 after 
7 years in opposition. 
Previous Labor government 
(2001-08) initiates an ‘Industry 
Plan’ (2003-04) to build 
capacity and capability of the 
sector generally & provide 




























Recognition in sector that CTC 
presents challenges to 
capacity, capability and 
adaptability of sector. 
Sector aware of emerging 
thinking in the UK re. 
‘concordats’ between the 
sector & government. Sector 
promotes concept with new 
government (1997). 
Carr government, re-elected in 
1999, commits to a Compact. 
The sector, through the 
‘Futures Forum’, develops a 
Community Sector Services 
Charter (2006-07) outlining a 
collective vision and shared 
values. 
Premier Bligh, herself a former 
social worker, agrees to pursue 
a compact with the sector. 
New LNP Premier, Campbell 
Newman, seeks to rein-in 
government programs and 
public spending. 
Industry Plan suffered from 
line agency resistance, 
ineffective leadership and 
inconsistent implementation 
leading to loss of confidence 
by sector. 
New government affirms 
importance of the sector’s role 
re. service delivery and 
Premier advocates partnership 
framework. 
Central agencies and sector 
leaders tasked to develop 
partnership framework.  
 
                                                 
25
 Here it is worth mentioning that, at the time the Rudd Labor government was elected, there were 
Labor administrations in every Australian jurisdiction. 
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Table 3 — A Comparison of Frameworks for Inter-sectoral Cooperation in Selected 
Australian States: Framework, Impacts & Future Directions 
 
















Bilateral framework document 
endorsed by State government 
and Forum of Non-
Government Agencies 
(FONGA). 
Initial emphasis on human 
services sector, intended to 
extend progressively to whole-
of-government and sector. 
Focus on working 
relationships and capacity-
building.  
Loosely linked to ‘State Plan’ 
& complementary policy 
frameworks.  
Joint Reference Group (JRG) 
comprised on FONGA and key 
line agency CEOs formed to 
oversee implementation. JRG 
has met on four occasions, 
between 2006-09.  
Delay between announcement 
of intent (2000) and launch 
(2006) cited as evidence of a 
lack of government 
commitment. 
Bilateral framework document 
endorsed by State government 
and Community Sector Futures 
Forum. 
Initial emphasis on community 
services sector.  
Focus on working 
relationships, building 
capacity, sustainability and 
engagement. 
Express linkage to state plan, 





Governance Committee (CGC) 
with Independent Chair. 
Secretariat support through 
Department for Communities. 
CGC oversees implementation 
of an Action Plan and reports 
annually on progress. 
After election, CGC ceases to 
meet and Chair is not renewed. 
Unilateral policy framework, 
although jointly developed and 
strongly endorsed by sector 
leadership. Takes place of 
‘Industry Plan’ (2004, now 
lapsed). 
Initial emphasis on community 
services sector (contracted 
services) with potential to 
extend progressively to whole-
of-government and sector. 
Partnership Forum (2010) 
established to enable 
government-sector dialogue 
and to develop and oversee 
framework. 
Central agency oversight of 
implementation with input 
from sector. 
Linked to ‘Putting the Public 
First’ (2009) and cascading 
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Table 3 — continued 
 












Few obvious positive impacts 
or benefits arising from 
Working Together, high levels 
of cynicism in both sector and 
bureaucracy.  
Good Practice Guides on 
‘Good Funding Policy and 
Practice’ (2006) and ‘NGO 
Participation in Regional 
Human Services Planning 
Processes’ (2007). NGO Red 
Tape Reduction report (2009). 
Surveys suggest poor 
penetration/awareness and low 
support/attachment in sector 
and in public service (Dalton 
et al 2008; Edgar & Lockie 
2010). 
Implementation is project-
based with early phases 
focused on cross-government 
promotion of and embedding 
the Compact; workforce 
development and volunteering. 
Natural disasters in 
Queensland in 2011 delayed 
progress on some compact 
initiatives and exacerbated 
budgetary position of 
government.  
Compact implementation was 
externally reviewed in 2011 
however release of final report 
precluded by timing of 2012 
election. 
Despite achievements in 
documenting the economic 
contribution of the sector and 
establishing regional 
frameworks for collaboration, 
the Compact and associated 
operational structures have 
been suspended pending 
further determination by the 
new LNP government. 
Major commitment of 
resources in 2011 Budget to 
close the ‘funding gap’ and 
enable new service provision 
($1 billion over 4 years). 
Government and sector are 
‘co-producing’ policy. The 
sector sees this as an important 
opportunity to address long-













NSW Council of Social 
Service sought pre-election 
commitments from the 
Opposition to renew the 
compact with more robust 
governance mechanisms. 
No commitments have been 
made by the O’Farrell Liberal-
National government. 
Regarded by some in the 
sector as the ‘exemplar’ 
framework agreement in the 
Australian context.  
Australian National Compact 
was strongly influenced by the 
Queensland Compact and 
there has been close 
engagement between the 
national and state governments 
in this policy space. 
The Compact is held in 
abeyance while the new LNP 
government pursues structural 
changes and deficit reduction 
measures. 
A compact is not a priority for 
the sector or for government in 
Western Australia. 
The sector wants funding 
certainty, full-cost pricing, fair 
contracting regimes & 
workforce development. 
Government wants a stable 
contracting environment & a 
viable social sector. 
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New South Wales 
 
The New South Wales (NSW) compact Working Together for NSW26 had a long 
gestation. In 1996 compact advocates within the community sector – aware of the 
Deakin Commission’s proposals for a concordat in the UK – successfully lobbied 
the recently elected Labor government to include a commitment to a formal 
agreement in its policy platform for the 1999 state election. On his government’s 
re-election Premier Bob Carr committed to the development of a compact to 
‘promote greater understanding … and a better working relationship’ (NSW 
Government 2000:33). However, it took until 2004 to produce a draft agreement 
and Working Together was not launched until 2006 by which time Carr had 
retired and a new Premier was at the helm. 
As with so many other framework agreements, Working Together, was 
modelled after the English compact (Edgar and Lockie 2010:360). It ‘applies to 
all Government and non-government organisations involved in the planning, 
funding, regulation and delivery of human services’ and embodies an in-principle 
commitment by the government and the NFPS to ‘use their best endeavours’ to: 
[build] appropriate organisational structures to support open 
communication, community participation and collaboration between 
Government and non-government organisations in planning, policy 
development, program design and service delivery and review. 
(DOCS/FONGA 2006:10) 
There is broad agreement that Working Together has been largely 
ineffective as an instrument for government-sector cooperation (Dalton et al 
2008; Edgar and Lockie 2010). Whereas the sector had advocated an enforceable 
agreement with binding mechanisms for dispute resolution, the government 
preferred an agreement that was more aspirational in nature – more of a broad 
statement of principle than a ‘contract’. Apart from an annual meeting of sector 
representatives and government officials, no dedicated governance structures or 
agreed action plans have been established. Political instability (the leadership of 
the NSW Labor Party would change four times from 1995-2009), a lack of central 
agency leadership, resistance from line agencies and failure of the sector to assert 
ownership of the NSW compact also played a part. 
Although public sector agencies and peak sector bodies today consider 
that Working Together has some symbolic merit, they also acknowledge that it has 
not achieved significant penetration either in the bureaucracy or within a 
variegated and fragmented NFPS. Reforms that have been initiated by the state 
government in this policy space have largely occurred without reference to 
Working Together. 
                                                 
26
 Working Together for NSW can be accessed at  
http://www.communitybuilders.nsw.gov.au/site/govinfo/150.html  
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The future of the NSW compact is uncertain. The NSW Labor government 
was defeated in the March 2011 general election and the NSW Council of Social 
Service (NCOSS) observes that the new government has no ‘specific proposal to 
have a formal relationship with the sector through a revitalised Compact or other 




The Queensland Compact: Towards a fairer Queensland (2008) is a relatively 
recent state/territory relational framework agreement. The Queensland Compact 
was built upon foundations established in 2006 by the Queensland Community 
Services Futures Forum – a coalition of state peak organisations. The compact 
document was developed collaboratively by the Futures Forum and the 
Queensland Department of Communities with the strong support of Premier Anna 
Bligh.27  
Senior Queensland government officials attested to Premier Bligh’s strong 
personal commitment to the Queensland Compact. One senior Labor figure has 
suggested that the notion of a compact is a natural ‘fit’ with Bligh’s political and 
policy sensibilities given her past involvement in the trade union movement and 
the community services sector.28 As a new Premier appointed in 2007 on the 
retirement of her popular (and populist) predecessor, Peter Beattie, a compact 
might also have been seen as an opportunity to shore up valuable alliances in the 
approach to the 2009 State election.  
The Queensland Compact ‘sets out expectations and commitments for the 
Queensland Government and the Non-profit Community Services Sector’ and 
aims, broadly, to ‘[foster] strong working relationships, [drive] engagement in 
planning and policy processes, and [strengthen] sector capacity’. It has been 
supported by a formal governance framework overseen by a Compact Governance 
Committee (CGC) comprised of five government and five sector representatives 
plus an independent Chair.29 The CGC has overseen the implementation of an 
Action Plan that ‘gives effect to the commitments within the Compact and creates 
practical change’.30 The CGC has also overseen the implementation of a 
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Communication and Embedding Plan that sets out ‘activities to inform and 
engage members, clients and stakeholders in the implementation of the 
Queensland Compact’ and thereby ‘support achievement of the Compact vision 
by raising awareness of the Compact and supporting implementation of its 
principles, goals and commitments.’31  
The Queensland Compact adopted an independent and transparent 
governance framework (including mandatory annual reporting); the development 
of an ‘Action Plan’; the establishment of mechanisms to encourage collaboration 
and clear communication; and the production of a suite of supporting materials 
and better practice guides. In its first two and a half years it pursued a wide 
variety of project-based initiatives aimed at building relationships and improving 
processes (Futures Forum/Queensland Government 2010). The Queensland 
Compact appeared to be regarded by the sector – and the Commonwealth – as 
fundamentally sound in terms of its language, the framing of its goals and 
principles, and its operational framework (ACOSS 2009:7-8).  
However, the March 2012 state election saw the Bligh Labor government 
swept from power in favour of the centre-right Liberal national party (LNP) led 
by Campbell Newman. The LNP has made no policy announcements concerning 
the compact, which together with the governance mechanisms established to give 
effect to it, are being held in abeyance while the new government considers its 
position. For the moment, the new LNP government is focused on reining-in 
programs, re-structuring the public service and reducing public expenditure. It 
remains to be seen whether it will endorse Queensland Compact and continue the 
suite of measures commenced under the Labor government to address systemic 




In Western Australia (WA) the Labor Government under former Premier Geoff 
Gallop (2001-06) engaged the NFPS in a dialogue about the relationship between 
government and the sector; the financial viability and sustainability of the NFP 
human services sector; and NFPS capacity-building. In 2003 the WA government 
and sector representatives signed up to an Industry Plan for the Non-Government 
Human Services Sector (2004). The Industry Plan was not intended to be ‘a 
formalised partnership agreement or compact’, although it left open the possibility 
of ‘a more formalised agreement’ in the future (DPC 2004:12).  
The Industry Plan offered a ‘framework for partnership’ affirming the 
‘distinct and complementary roles’ as well as the ‘shared goals and values’ of 
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government and the non-government human services sector. A 2004 Statement of 
Partnership set out a commitment to establish an Industry Council to ‘implement, 
monitor and further develop the Industry Plan for the whole of the Human 
Services Sector’.  
The Industry Plan initially compared favourably to policy frameworks in 
other jurisdictions that lacked either targets and/or coherent mechanisms for 
implementation. However, an inconsistent application of supporting policies 
resulted in an erosion of trust and a lack of confidence in the formal structures 
established to guide implementation (WACOSS 2009:11). Although the Statement 
of Partnership had been held up as a possible precursor to a more formalised 
agreement, the Industry Plan lost momentum between 2005 and the election in 
2008 of a centre-right Liberal-National Government led by Premier Colin 
Barnett.32 
In October 2009, the new government launched its own manifesto, Putting 
the Public First, in which the government articulated a vision of community 
sector organisations as financially sustainable ‘social enterprises’ operated along 
business lines. NFPOs would become ‘genuine partners in the delivery of human 
services, untethered from the need for unnecessarily prescriptive processes and 
controls to govern relationships’ (EAC 2009:i). The Premier stated his 
government’s intention to demonstrate its ‘trust’ in the capabilities of the sector by 
‘progressively shifting the delivery of services away from government agencies to 
the community sector’ (Barnett 2010). In May 2010 a Partnership Forum was 
established comprising public and community sector leaders. Chaired by a former 
head of the federal Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Peter Shergold, 
the Forum would oversee a re-shaping of the working relationship. 
The result of these deliberations, the Delivering Community Services in 
Partnership Policy, was announced by the government in July 2011 (DPC 2011b). 
This initiative has the strong support of the Premier and the sector. The policy lead 
is shared by the Department of Premier and Cabinet, the Treasury and the 
Department of Finance. The partnership framework is not a bilateral agreement, 
even though it was a genuinely collaborative endeavour and some of its provisions 
resemble those set out in compacts. According to one senior official, there was 
little interest in ‘wordsmithing an aspirational document’ (Butcher 2011).  
A focus on pragmatism was evidenced by the announcement in the 2011-
12 Budget of a four year, $1 billion ‘social services package’ of which over $600 
million is earmarked to ‘address a shortfall in the amount paid by Government to 
the sector for the services they provide’ (DPC 2011a).  Clearly, in Western 
Australia ‘action’ (meaning money) speaks louder than words. 
                                                 
32
 Observers in Western Australia attribute the loss of momentum in part to the resignation of 
Premier Geoff Gallop in 2006 and the election of Alan Carpenter as leader of the WA Labor Party. 
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Key Observations from the Cases 
 
What we observe in the cases presented above is that formal framework 
agreements between government and civil society actors serve to convey a mutual 
endorsement of an idea of participatory or shared governance. However, unless 
they are institutionally embedded, compacts can be marginalised and rendered 
inconsequential as emergent issues crowd them off the policy agenda. This does 
not mean that governments’ attachment to compacts is necessarily shallow and 
instrumental, but to expect such policy frameworks to remain at the centre of any 
government’s policy agenda is unrealistic (as indeed is the expectation of any real 
sharing of executive authority).  
When governing parties are in a strong position politically (the early Blair, 
Chrétien or Rudd governments) they might be better able to overcome the 
institutional and bureaucratic inertia that stands in the way of the cultural changes 
required to give full effect to collaborative governance. On the other hand, 
political surety might also breed complacency and inaction. When in a weakened 
political position (Gillard, Brown), governing parties might be more inclined to 
seize the opportunity provided by compacts for policy differentiation in a highly 
contested political marketplace. Whether compacts are capable of generating 
sufficient political capital to sustain an embattled government’s interest amid the 
clamour of competing policy issues is another matter. 
 
Policy entrepreneurs, policy windows and policy durability 
 
Much is made in the scholarly literature of the importance of ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ and ‘champions’ (who are not necessarily one and the same) in 
advocating for and maintaining commitment to compacts (see Casey et al 2008a). 
In the UK a coalition of interests and ideas, forged over a number of years while 
Labour was in opposition, was instrumental in articulating a coherent vision of a 
compact and the institutional frameworks required to make it work.   
In Canada, the Broadbent Panel provided the catalyst for a sitting 
government to somewhat opportunistically seize on the idea of a compact for the 
political capital it might create (Elson 2006:39). Brock for one contends that 
certain policy actors effectively ‘hijacked’ the policy agenda by focussing on the 
sector’s relationship with government rather than the core problems of voluntary 
sector accountability and governance identified by the Broadbent Panel (Brock 
2008:16). A subsequent failure to establish a durable institutional framework, 
coupled with a narrow support base and high turnover within senior ranks of the 
public service, compromised the Accord – fatally in the view of a number of 
commentators (Elson 2007:56 and 2006:39-40; Phillips 2003a:32-51). 
These events have Australian analogues. In New South Wales overtures 
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from the community sector convinced a sitting government to adopt a compact as 
part of its policy platform. However, a key player in these events observes that 
unlike the English compact, Working Together had not emerged from the sector 
as a mature concept negotiated with a ‘government in waiting’.33 This served to 
weaken the sector’s influence and cede control of the policy to a government and 
a bureaucracy that were still in thrall to market-based approaches to service 
delivery and unwilling to be fettered by a compact. Once announced, the NSW 
compact had few champions in government and quickly lost momentum and 
relevance.  
Queensland and Western Australia provide contrasting cases. In 
Queensland the sector, acting independently of government, mapped out a 
collective vision and shared values in order to provide a platform for constructive 
engagement with government (Futures Forum 2007). Meanwhile, major internal 
and external reviews of service delivery in Queensland led to a realisation within 
government of the need for systemic reform.34 The convergence of a new 
consensus in the sector and the anointment of a sympathetic Premier with an 
election to win created the window for the Queensland Compact and placed the 
sector in a position to influence the shape of the governance and implementation 
mechanisms.  
In Western Australia, a local economic boom coupled with a change of 
government provided the policy window in which a new settlement could take 
shape. The sector, represented by the Western Australia Council of Social Service 
(WACOSS), and the state government made common cause:  the sector brought 
to the discussions a deep practical understanding of the political and bureaucratic 
impediments to inter-sectoral cooperation; the new Premier brought a 
determination to engage the sector in a shared endeavour to meet the challenges 
facing the WA community. One observer suggested that WACOSS and the state 
Department of Premier and Cabinet are now ‘joined at the hip’ and each will be 
under considerable political and institutional pressure to make the new 
arrangements work. 
 
Policy windows open, policy windows close 
 
When the National Compact was launched in March 2010, only the Canadian 
Accord had experienced a change of government. This event appeared to 
vindicate concerns that without a robust institutional and governance framework, 
                                                 
33
 Personal communication. 
34
 The Queensland Audit Office (QAO 2007) undertook a major audit of NFPS funding in 2007 
and the (then) Service Delivery and Performance Commission (a performance monitoring body 
within the Department of Planning and Communities) also undertook a review of the 
commissioning and funding of services in 2006-07. 
29
Butcher et al.: An Australian National Compact
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
Brought to you by | Curtin University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/18/17 2:10 AM
 
compacts are susceptible to relegation or outright abandonment by incoming 
governments. The experiences of Western Australia and New South Wales 
suggest that even without a change of government, leadership changes can cause 
compacts to lose momentum and policy relevance.  
Recent events in the UK and Queensland demonstrate that even well-
established institutional and administrative structures do not provide a bulwark 
against the policy agendas of in-coming governments. Where compacts have been 
inherited by centre-right governments – as has occurred in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Western Australia, New South Wales and Queensland – there is 
evidence that governments will choose to de-emphasise their ‘civil society’ 
dimensions in favour of relations with particular industry sectors (e.g. disability, 
housing, labour markets, etc.), enterprises (e.g. NFP service providers, ‘social 
enterprises), individuals and/or communities, thereby placing the policy 
framework firmly in the service of the commissioning environment. 
A political transition is under way in Australia’s states and territories as 
long-standing Labor governments falter under the weight of incumbency. Western 
Australia elected a new centre-right government in 2008, as did Victoria in 2010, 
New South Wales in 2011 and Queensland in 2012. Labor governments were 
narrowly returned in Tasmania and South Australia in 2010. Meanwhile, long-
term Labor governments in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern 
Territory face the polls in October and August 2012, respectively.  
Whereas in New South Wales a moribund agreement has not received any 
attention from the new government, in Western Australia new life has been 
breathed into the government-NFPS relationship by a settlement that empowers 
rather than marginalises the sector. While it might be casually assumed that 
centre-left governments are the natural allies of the NFPS, some observers in the 
sector accuse centre-left parties of being steeped in a ‘top-down’ view of 
government in which a compliant sector serves as handmaiden to the state. By 
contrast the classical liberal traditions with which many centre-right parties are 
endowed recognise the legitimacy of the sector’s ‘voice’ while at the same time 
holding an essentially instrumentalist view of the sector as a preferred agent of 
contracted service delivery.  
Federally, Labor is in minority government and its prospects at the next 
general election (to be held by 30 November 2013) are highly uncertain. In a 
political environment such as Australia’s, full of highly charged and rancorous 
debate about hotly contested issues such as climate change and asylum seekers, 
the National Compact does not register in the public consciousness. The federal 
opposition’s attitude towards the National Compact is unclear and parts of the 
sector appear to be ambivalent. This ambivalence is to some degree a reflection of 
the fact that three years on from the election of the Labor government, the sector 
is still finding its collective voice. To this end, a new member-directed 
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organisation – the Community Council for Australia (CCA) – was established in 
2010: ‘to lead by being an effective voice on common and shared issues affecting 





The pursuit of compacts by national and sub-national governments in the UK, 
Canada and Australia exhibit processes of policy diffusion and political/policy 
convergence. Evidence for diffusion can be found in the attribution of provenance 
by compact adopters to the English compact. Evidence for convergence, on the 
other hand, lies in the fact that in almost every case compacts were initially 
adopted by centre-left governments. This suggests that the governing party’s 
position on the political spectrum is a strong predictor of the adoption of policy 
instruments of this type. Moreover, we see compacts following in the wake of an 
earlier wave of policy diffusion and convergence in the form of NPM and the 
embrace of public administration doctrines favouring contractual governance. 
However, policy diffusion and convergence do not explain observed differences 
in the practical expression of policy frameworks for cooperation in different 
polities. Although a number of common themes emerge from the cases, we also 
observe that policy frameworks for inter-sectoral cooperation are shaped by the 
political and institutional dynamics prevailing in each jurisdiction. In this sense, 
‘context is king’. 
What emerges from this analysis is that formal relationship frameworks, 
whether in the form of bilateral compacts or unilateral policy statements, have 
both ‘political’ and ‘policy’ drivers insofar as they serve both the short-term 
political needs of their advocates (both state and non-state actors) and ostensibly 
seek to address medium/long-term policy problems. What matters is the relative 
importance of each. Where politics is the principal driver (as might be said of 
Canada and New South Wales), attachment to the policy might be weak and 
implementation might be compromised. On the other hand, where policy is the 
key driver (as would appear to be the case in the UK, Queensland and Western 
Australia) one might hope to see the emergence of more durable and adaptive 
policy frameworks. 
So where does the Australian compact sit on the politics-policy 
continuum? Informal commentary within the NFPS suggests a degree of 
impatience with the pace of change and ambivalence about the content of the 
reform agenda and the manner of implementation. In part, this is a function of 
unrealistic expectations about the capacity of the National Compact to resolve all 
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 For further information see the CCA’s website at: http://www.communitycouncil.com.au/  
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of the problems that have beset the relationship between government and the 
sector for well over a decade (and for some a vindication of cynical expectations 
that a compact will fail). In part too it is a function of the inherent complexity 
(and for some, the unintelligibility) of the reform agenda and the range of actors 
that need to be engaged to bring it to fruition.  
There is a perception – not entirely unjustified – that the National 
Compact had become becalmed in a kind of policy doldrums. This was to some 
extent due to a government distracted by its own internal machinations and 
various policy and political crises – not the least of which being the overthrow of 
a sitting Prime Minister and the subsequent ignominy of minority government. 
Prime Minister Gillard has responded by declaring 2011 as ‘a year of delivery and 
decision’ (Coorey 2010). The suite of not-for-profit reform initiatives announced 
during the 2010 election might just put some wind in the Australian compact’s 
sails. The Australian government needs to deliver results if it is to embed the 
National Compact in the NFP policy space and build the reform momentum the 
sector wants and needs. It might not have much time to do it. 
Do governments and the NFPS need compacts? Clearly, governments and 
civil society actors in many jurisdictions have concluded that they do, although 
their faith in the potential for such instruments to materially re-shape the 
relationship between governments and the NFPS is frequently challenged. 
Emerging discourses on relational or network governance do not presuppose 
compacts or similar instruments, although they might embrace compacts as one of 
a range of strategies to achieve more connected governance (see Casey 2011). 
The bottom line is that relationality does not require compacts, but compacts 
require relationality. 
Even an ineffectual agreement can be a useful means of framing the on-
going dialogue with government and within the sector itself. As Kendall (2003, 
2009, 2010) and Morison (2000) observe, compacts create a space within which a 
discourse can occur and evolve. Indeed, Lindquist suggests that compacts might 
require ‘a decade or two’ to mature (Lindquist 2010:164). Even Brock, who 
considers that the Canadian Accord fell well short of achieving a genuine 
paradigm shift in government-NFPS relations, nevertheless concedes that it 
provided the foundation for ‘inexorable’, albeit unpredictable change (Brock 
2008, 2004).  
Parties to these policy frameworks need to be reminded that a compact is 
‘a process not a paper’ (Bullain and Toftisova 2005:66) in which legitimacy stems 
from the credibility of the actors engaged in giving effect to it (Phillips 2003b). 
Compacts are not intended to be static documents; rather, they are intended to 
authorise on-going processes – including oversight, formal review and the 
dissemination of good practises – that provide a catalyst for systemic reform 
(Craig et al. 2002, Rawsthorne and Christian 2004, Toftisova 2005). 
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